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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has juiisdiction m this case pursuant to Section 78-2-2(3)(a) & 
(5) of the Utah Code Utah Code Ann § 78-2-2(3(a) & (5) (2002) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Respondents American Asbestos Abatement and Workeis Compensation Fund (heremaftei, 
collectively, UWCF"), aie satisfied with the Statement of Issues and the preservation of the same 
set forth m the Bnef of Amentemps 
TEXT OF AUTHORITIES 
The full text of Utah Code Ann § 34A-2-413 (2005) is set forth verbatim m the Addendum 
to the Brief of Amentemps 
The full text of Utah Code Ann § 63-46b-16 (2004) is set forth verbatim in the Addendum 
to this brief 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
WCF has no objection or addition to the Statement of the Case, including the Statement of 
Facts, set forth in the Brief of Amentemps 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The court of appeals property applied the factors set forth in Union Pacific RR Co v Utah 
State Tax Commission, 2000 UT 40, 999 P 2d 17, to determine that the finding of the Laboi 
Commission of tentative pemianent total disability was a seiiatim final agency action that was 
appealable to the court of appeals 
1 
Because a denial of appeal during second step proceedings would result in irreparable harm 
to WCF and other employers and insurers similarly situated, the opinion of the court of appeals 
satisfies due process. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY FOLLOWED THE 
UNION PACIFICTEST TO DETERMINE JURISDICTION 
Section 63-46b-l 6(1) provides that, "The court of appeals has jurisdiction to review all 
final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-
16 (2004). See also Id § 63-46b-14(3)(a). Thus, the court of appeals has jurisdiction only to 
hear appeals of final agency action. 
Section 34A-2-413(6) of the Utah Code (hereinafter referred to as "Subsection (6)") 
provides that an initial finding by the Labor Commission of pemianent total disability is not final 
until certain "second-step" proceedings are completed. Id., § 34A-2-413(6) (2005). 
At first blush, it would appear that a plain reading of Subsection (6) would indicate that the 
initial finding of permanent total disability is not a final agency action subject to appeal to the 
Utah Court of Appeals. Indeed, in Target Trucking v. Utah Labor Commission, 2005 UT App 
70, Tf 5, 108 P.3d 128, 129, the court of appeals determined that the initial determination of 
permanent total disability was not a final agency action.1 
In Target Trucking, the court of appeals relied upon Thomas v. Color Country 
Management, 2004 UT 12, 84 P.3d 1201. There, this court ultimately determined that a tentative 
1
 The court of appeals disavowed Target Trucking in the instant case. Ameritemps, Inc. v. Labor Commission, 2005 
UT App 491,m| 17,23, 128 P.3d 21, 37-38, 39. 
2 
or preliminary finding of permanent total disability is not a final order for purposes of 
enforcement of the same, as an abstract of award, in district court. Id. f^ 27, 84 P.3d at 1209." 
In making the aforesaid ruling in Thomas, this court specific rejected any analysis that the 
preliminary determination of pemianent total disability was a "final agency action" within the 
meaning of Section 63-46b-16 of the Utah Code, as explained in Barker v. Utah Public Sennce 
Commission, 970 P.2d 702, 705 (Utah 1998); and Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Utah State Tax 
Commission, 2000 UT 40, 999 P.2d 17. This court stated as follows: 
Because this act clearly defines "final order," we need not turn to 
Union Pacific for guidance on what constitutes a "final order" for 
which an abstract may issue. Thus, what constitutes a final order for 
purposes of appellate review is different than what constitutes a final 
order for purposes of the issuance of an abstract of an administrative 
award. 
Although the Union Pacific test does not apply to determining what 
constitutes a "final order" for which an abstract may issue under the 
Worker's Compensation Fund Act, Union Pacific continues to be the 
standard by which "final administrative action" will be judged for the 
purpose of judicial review." 
Id. fh 14-15, 84 P.3d at 1206 (emphasis added). 
Thus, despite the apparent plain language of Subsection (6), this court has already 
determined that the Union Pacific test should be applied for determining whether the court of 
appeals had appellate jurisdiction of the preliminary detemiination of permanent total disability 
in favor of Albert and against Ameritemps. 
II. 
UNDER THE UNION PACIFICTEST, THE PRELIMINARY 
DETERMINATION OF PERMANENT TOTAL DISABLITY 
WAS A FINAL AGENCY ACTION FOR PURPOSES OF 
APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
" Since Thomas was decided, the legislature has amended Subsection (6) to provide that a preliminary finding of 
permanent total disability is final for purposes of obtaining an abstract of award. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-
413(6)(c) (2005 version). 
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Ameritemps apparently does not dispute the court of appeals' analysis resulting in a 
determination that there was final agency action. Even so, the court of appeals' analysis under 
the Union Pacific test was appropriate. 
In Union Pacific, this court set forth a three-part test to determine whether an agency action 
is final. That test is as follows: 
(1) Has administrative decisionmaking reached a stage where judicial 
review will not disrupt the orderly process of adjudication?; 
(2) Have rights or obligations been determine or will legal 
consequences flow from the agency action?; and 
(3) Is the agency action, in whole or in part, not preliminary, 
preparatory, procedural, or intermediate with regard to subsequent 
agency action? 
Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 2000 UT 40, f 16, 999 P.2d 
17,21. 
Under the Orderly Process for Adjudication factor, the court of appeals reasoned that 
"[ajlthough issues remained unresolved concerning the possibility of reemployment, the question 
of whether Albert was permanently totally disabled was disposed of completely by the Board." 
Ameritemps, 2005 UT 491, j^ 20, 128 P.2d at 38. The court of appeals further reasoned that since 
the Appeals Board refused to reconsider its order, then appeal at this stage of the proceedings 
would not in any way disturb the orderly process of adjudication. Id., 128 P.3d at 38-39. 
Moreover, there will be nothing that would have prevented Ameritemps from commencing an 
investigation into an appropriate rehabilitation plan while the appeal was pending. Finally, 
because Subsection (6) has now been amended to provide that the preliminary determination of 
permanent total disability is a final order for purposes of district court enforcement, Albert would 
be entitled to pemianent total disability subsistence benefits while the appeal was pending. Utah 
4 
Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(6)(b) (2005). Thus, the court of appeals' holding under the first factor 
was appropriate. 
Under the second factor, Rights or Obligations Detemiined, the court of appeals 
detemiined that the Labor Commission made a specific finding of permanent total disability and 
ordered that Albert was entitled to subsistence benefits to start immediately. Ameritemps, 2005 
UT 491, If 21, 128 P.3d at 39. Thus, there was an order and consequences that immediately 
flowed from it. 
As to the last factor, Preliminary, Preparatory, Procedural or Intermediate, the court of 
appeals determined that the preliminary order of permanent total disability was not comparable 
to the types of proceedings that are not final, such as a remand for further proceedings, an order 
converting informal proceedings into formal ones, a denial for a motion to dismiss, etc. Id. f 22-
23, 128 P.3d at 39. In the instant case, although Subsection (6) appears preliminary because 
there are further proceedings to be instituted, it is not preliminary in reference to the rights and 
obligations of the parties. To illustrate, consider the result if the decision of the Labor 
Commission is either affirmed or reversed on appeal. If the decision of the Labor Commission is 
affirmed, then, if the parties have not already done so, the Respondents can then proceed to 
prepare a proposed rehabilitation plan under "second-step proceedings" as set forth under 
Subsection (6). There would be no need to return and "relitigate" the issue of whether the 
injured worker was permanently and totally disabled. If, on the other hand, the court of appeals 
reverses the Labor Commission's preliminary determination of permanent total disability, then 
5 
the injured worker's claim of permanent total disability is dismissed and, of course, no further 
proceedings are necessary.3 
In summary, unlike the types of orders that are preliminary, preparatory, procedural or 
intermediate, under either result on appeal, there would be no unnecessary "duplication of effort" 
by the parties or the Labor Commission. 
III. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS' ANALYSIS MEETS DUE 
PROCESS CONSTRAINTS 
Ameritemps has argued that the Court of appeals' exercise of jurisdiction, as applied, 
abrogates its constitutional rights of due process. Ameritemps contends that it has been deprived 
of the opportunity to pursue "second-step" proceedings before the Labor Commission. That 
argument simply ignores the holding of the court of appeals. The court of appeals acknowledged 
that the Labor Commission's order left "unresolved the issue of reemployment... ." The court 
of appeals goes on to state that the agency still was required to conduct the second part of the 
Section 34A-2-413 analysis to determine whether Albert could be rehabilitated. 2005 UT App 
491, f 23, 128 P.3d at 39. Indeed, Ameritemps has pointed to nothing in the Labor 
Commission's orders or in the court of appeals' opinion that in any way precludes it from 
pursuing "second-step" proceedings under subsection 6. 
Conversely, if the preliminary determination of permanent total disability is not a final 
agency action for purposes of judicial review, WCF, and any other Respondent who wishes to 
seek judicial review of preliminary determination of permanent total disability, is denied due 
process of law. In this case, if the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction, WCF is placed in the 
1
 Of course, the injured worker could petition for a Writ of Certiorari to this court. 
4
 In its brief in opposition to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari\ WCF argued that the Petition was moot because 
Ameritemps will get what it wants, to pursue "second-step" proceedings, whether it prevails on the Petition or not. 
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untenable position of having to await the "second-step" proceedings to "see" whether Albert is 
ultimately found to be permanently and totally disabled. It must do this because if Albert is 
ultimately found to be disabled and Ameritemps then appeals and is successful on appeal, it must 
then participate again in "first-step" proceedings to determine whether it, rather than 
Ameritemps, is the cause of Albert's disability. Indeed, if it is cautious, WCF would have to go 
to the time and expense of participating in a reemployment plan in the event that, after so many 
years, American Asbestos Abatement is determined to be the direct cause of Albert's disability. 
This lack of finality places an irreparable and onerous burden upon WCF. 
Moreover, although it is not the situation in this case, since an insurance carrier or self-
insured employer is required to pay subsistence benefits during "second-step" proceedings, the 
insurance earner or self-insured is effectively ordered to pay money from which it has no right of 
appeal.5 Although no Utah court has addressed the aforesaid due process considerations under 
either the United States or Utah Constitutions, other jurisdictions have held where irreparable 
harm would result to a petitioner if it were not to take appellate jurisdiction over non-final 
administrative proceedings, the court should, nonetheless, accept jurisdiction. See Isbrandtsen 
Co. v. United States, 211 F.2d 51, 55(D.C. Cir. 1954) (where irreparable harm would result to an 
aggrieved party as a result of an agency ruling, agency action, though not final, is reviewable); 
Atlantic Seaboard Corp. v. Federal Power Commission, 201 F.2d 568, 572 (4n Cir. 1953) (a loss 
of $385,000 that could not be recouped is irreparable, resulting in appellate review of a non-final 
order); Consumers Power Co. v. Michigan Public Service Commission, 415 Mich. 134, 154-55, 
327 N.W.2d 875, 883 (1982) (while courts customarily do not review administrative decisions 
* Curiously, for this reason, it would seem that Ameritemps would want to have a right of appeal after a preliminary 
determination of permanent total disability. Again, since an affirmance of the court of appeals' ruling would 
actually benefit Ameritemps, it appears that Ameritemps' claims are moot. 
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that are non-final, where a party suffers irreparable harm, the court does not have to wait for final 
agency action.)6 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the above discussion, this court should affirm the court of appeals' exercise of 
appellate jurisdiction in this case and remand the matter to the Labor Commission for further 
proceedings under Section 34A-2-413(6) of the Utah Code. 
Respectfully submitted this & day of July, 2006. /£ 
A^/fi^-— 
Floyd Wablm, Attorney for the Respondents 
Workers Compensation Fund and American Asbestos 
Abatement 
' Although none of the above-cited cases directly refers to due process, WCF contends that it is certainly implied. 
8 
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§ 63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of agency 
action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required by the appellate 
rules of the appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern all 
additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial review 
of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, 
or organize the record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and copies for 
the record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten, 
summarize, or organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's 
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially 
prejudiced by any of the fol lowing: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action is 
based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any s ta tute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making 
process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a decision-
making body or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by 
the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of 
the whole record before the court; 
13 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the 
inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational 
basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
14 
